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THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Richard J. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The following chronicles the record of the United States
government on death penalty issues in the Inter-American
system for the protection of human rights.
Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man ("American Declaration") states, "Every human
being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his per-
son."' Individuals under sentence of death in the United
States have invoked this article and others in the American
Declaration in petitions to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights ("Commission"), established in 1960. The
Commission is one of the principal organs of the Organization
of American States ("OAS"), of which the United States is a
member. The American Declaration has been interpreted, on
several occasions, to create binding legal obligations on all
OAS member states.2 The United States government, how-
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1. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2,
1948, Ninth International Conference of American States, art. I [hereinafter
American Declaration], reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING
TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 15, 16, OAS/ser.IJV/I.4 rev.
8 (2001) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS], available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm.
2. Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
9191 46-49, OEA/ser.IJV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987); Advisory Opinion No. OC-
10/90, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., Ser. A, No. 10, 9191 35-45 (1989); Case 12.243 (Garza
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ever, "categorically rejects" any contention "that the Ameri-
can Declaration... has acquired legally binding force for all
OAS countries."3
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights
("American Convention") contains several provisions limiting
the application of the death penalty. These limitations in-
clude the imposition of the death penalty only for "the most
serious crimes;" a prohibition on extension of the death pen-
alty to crimes to which it does not apply at the time of treaty
ratification; no reestablishment once the death penalty has
been abolished; prohibition for political offenses; and prohibi-
tion of the penalty's application to persons under eighteen or
over seventy at the time the crime was committed, and preg-
nant women.4 The United States signed the American Con-
vention in 1977 but has not taken any serious steps toward
its ratification. Because of non-ratification, the United States
cannot submit to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, which hears cases referred to it by the
Commission or by governments.
The Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty ("Protocol") entered into
force on August 28, 1991, for the eight OAS countries that
ratified it.6 The Protocol is similar to Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"),7 to which
all forty-three member states of the Council of Europe adhere,
and ratification of which is a condition of future membership
v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, 60, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev.
(2001).
3. Case 11.139 (Andrews v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 59,
OEA/ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
4. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 23, 24.
5. Id. at 50. Under Article 62.1 of the American Convention, a State party
to the Convention may recognize the binding jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. See id. at 42.
6. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. 73, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 1, at 79.
7. Protocol No. 6 to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Apr. 28, 1983,
Europ. T.S. No. 114, reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 259 (David Weissbrodt et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS].
1160 [Vol. 42
DEATH PENALTY SYMPOSIUM
in the Council.8 The United States has not signed or ratified
the Protocol on the death penalty.
The United States government has been the subject of
numerous individual contentious petitions before the Inter-
American Commission challenging U.S. procedures in the ap-
plication of the death penalty. The United States has pre-
vailed in such cases on only one occasion, where the petition
was declared inadmissible.9 The United States has never rec-
ognized the validity of a decision against it by the Commis-
sion in any capital case, nor has it taken any steps to comply
with recommendations made by the Commission.
There is only one case in which the United States has
appeared before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
In that case, Mexico invoked the advisory jurisdiction of the
Court to raise a question about the interpretation of the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations.' ° The Mexican gov-
ernment asked the Court to interpret the Vienna Convention
so as to clarify issues of United States compliance with that
treaty in regard to the many Mexican nationals under sen-
tence of death in ten states of the United States." The U.S.
government sent a delegation of four senior attorneys from
the State Department and the U.S. Department of Justice.
The delegation noted at the outset that the request of Mexico
"is patently an attempt to subject the United States to the
contentious jurisdiction of this Court, even though the United
States is not a party to the American Convention and has not
accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction."'2 The delega-
tion argued, inter alia, that "Mexico has presented a conten-
tious case in the guise of a request of an advisory opinion,"
and that the Vienna Convention "is neither a human rights
treaty nor a treaty 'concerning' the protection of human
8. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The European Union in Support of the Peti-
tioner at 5-6, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (mem.) (No. 00-
8727), cert. dismissed, 533 U.S. 975 (2001).
9. See Case 10.031 (Celestine v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62,
OEA/ser.L.IVJII.77, doc. 7 rev.1 (1989).
10. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 262.
11. See Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Inter-Am.
Ct.H.R., Ser. A, No. 16, 1 2 (1999).
12. Id. 26 (providing, inter alia, a summary of the Brief of the United
States of June 1, 1998).
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rights."1"
In virtually all petitions against the United States in
capital cases, the Commission issues precautionary measures
under Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure. Precautionary
measures are issued "to prevent irreparable harm to persons,"
and without prejudice to a decision on the merits of the case. 4
The Commission typically asks the U.S. government to fore-
stall the execution to permit the Commission the time to con-
sider the petition.'5 The United States government has con-
cluded that precautionary measures from the Commission are
"non-binding in nature," and has failed or refused to give pre-
cautionary measures any legal effect in domestic law."
This article provides an overview of death penalty litiga-
tion against the United States in the Inter-American human
rights system. In that context, it reviews the claims raised in
petitions filed with the Inter-American Commission by death
row inmates in the United States, how the U.S. government
defends the decisions of domestic courts in those cases, and
how the Commission has evolved in its resolution of capital
issues. On at least one occasion, the United States appeared
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to defend
its practices in capital litigation.'" That litigation, too, is ex-
amined here.
The overall practice of the U.S. government in this inter-
national litigation, as suggested above, demonstrates that it
actively avoids assuming new treaty obligations that limit
application of the death penalty. It negates interpretations of
international law that adversely affect its defense of the
death penalty. When it becomes a defendant in international
13. Id.
14. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 1,
at 127. All references herein are to the newest amendments to the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Commission, which took place in May of 2001, unless quoted in
text or otherwise indicated.
15. See, e.g., Case 11.193 (Sankofa v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 387,
OEA/ser.LIV/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001). In Sankofa, the Commission twice is-
sued precautionary measures and twice sent notes to the U.S. government. The
notes and the precautionary measures requested that the governor of the state
of Texas stay the execution pending a full investigation by the Commission into
the allegations raised by the petitioner. See id. $ 5, 7, 15, 27.
16. See Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, $ 115,
OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
17. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 11.
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litigation, the U.S. government typically invokes, vigorously
and energetically, procedural protections that can only be
characterized as "technicalities" at all stages of that litiga-
tion. It aggressively contests the alleged violations, whether
they be raised by countries, such as Paraguay or Germany in
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), or individual death
row petitioners before the Commission. The issue here is not,
however, whether the government lawyers are doing their
jobs as advocates; they act with high technical proficiency,
and their advocacy for their client is aggressive. It is, in-
stead, the contrast of the posture of the government in litiga-
tion with that of its willingness to comply with the decisions
it so vigorously contests. It seems incongruous, at least, and
arrogant, at worst, to respect the forum enough to accept its
procedures and engage in debate about the appropriate appli-
cation of its norms, but not to respect the outcome when it is
not favorable to the government. When the Commission, or
even the ICJ, issues a decision, report or order, the U.S. gov-
ernment simply ignores, declines, or refuses to comply with it.
In short, the U.S. legal position in international capital litiga-
tion can be summarized as follows: resist new obligations,
vigorously contest everything and comply with nothing.
A review of capital cases against the United States in the
Inter-American system is important for several reasons.
First and foremost, while U.S. death penalty litigation at the
Commission in the 1980s involved only two cases, increases in
the number of petitions by death row inmates against the
United States and many of the Caribbean countries make it
one of the most significant areas of Commission activity. 8 It
18. I mention capital litigation involving the Caribbean countries here be-
cause there are a large number of capital cases pursued by petitioners from
those countries to international tribunals. Disagreements about the interpreta-
tion of international obligations involving the death penalty have led to the
withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago from the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in Trinidad and
Tobago's case, from the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights as well.
See David A. C. Simmons, Conflicts of Law and Policy in the Caribbean - Hu-
man Rights and the Enforcement of the Death Penalty - Between a Rock and A
Hard Place, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 263, 282 (2000); Natasha Parassran
Concepcion, The Legal Implications of Trinidad & Tobago's Withdrawal from
the American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 847 (2001);
cf., Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 563
(1998). Those topics, however, lie outside the scope of this article.
116320021
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is important to document the history and breadth of that ju-
risprudence. 9 Second, the U.S. position at the Commission
exposes broader and deeper conflicts in diplomacy and law,
and in foreign policy and international legal positions of the
U.S. with regard to human rights. In the Inter-American sys-
tem, while the United States always has been a strong politi-
cal supporter of its human rights enforcement mechanisms, it
has blanched at assuming treaty obligations or in complying
with the decisions against it by those same mechanisms.
This double standard threatens U.S. credibility in demanding
human rights compliance by other governments, not only in
the Americas but also throughout the world. Third, and more
personally, the United States is the most frequent focus of pe-
titions filed at the Commission by law students enrolled in
American University's International Human Rights Law
Clinic, which I founded in 1990. Most of those cases involve
the death penalty."
19. The Commission does not publish specific information about names of
petitioners or the nature of their claims. Due to the International Human
Rights Law Clinic's activity in this area, however, as well as requests for assis-
tance in filing from U.S. petitioners, there are at least thirty-four cases against
the United States to which I can refer by name. Seventeen of those involve peti-
tioners sentenced to death and challenge some aspect of their convictions, with
many more pending, according to the Commission's own recently published sta-
tistics, which are examined in the text. For a brief summary of capital and non-
capital cases against the United States, see Richard J. Wilson, The United
States in the Inter-American Human Rights System (2001) (unpublished paper
presented at a conference on the Inter-American human rights system held at
Northwestern University, April 21, 2001).
20. The location of the Clinic and the Commission in Washington, D.C.,
combined with the broad provisions on standing to file petitions and who may
represent petitioners before the Commission in its Rules of Procedure (see Arti-
cle 23), make it an ideal venue for student practice. I am the founding director
of the Clinic, which began its work in 1990. This academic year, there are four
faculty members supervising the casework of twenty-six students in human
rights and political asylum cases. Clinic students and faculty have litigated
more than twenty cases in the Inter-American human rights system. Clinic
students have appeared in contentious litigation, in friendly settlement discus-
sions and follow-up, and in country situation working sessions at the Commis-
sion. The latter sessions occur when the Commission holds hearings "on the
human rights situation in one or more States" of a general nature, and multiple
perspectives may be offered. See Commission's Rules of Procedure, supra note
14, Article 64(1). Students and faculty have collaborated in the work at the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights, in San Jose, Costa Rica. Students have
prepared written pleadings and I have represented petitioners or amici in sev-
eral hearings in three cases there. I have also written about the capital litiga-
tion in the clinic on several occasions. See, e.g., Richard Wilson, Race, Criminal
Justice and the Death Penalty, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 395, 403 (1994); Richard J.
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II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW
The human rights system of the OAS consists of the
Commission, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the "Court"), which
sits in San Jose, Costa Rica. The OAS was created and the
American Declaration was approved in Bogotd, Colombia, in
1948, some months before the United Nations approved the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.21 The Commission
was created in 1959 and elected its first members, seven in-
dependent experts in the field of human rights, in 1960. It
began to examine individual petitions in 1966 and became a
principal organ of the OAS under the 1967 Protocol of Buenos
Aires.2" The OAS General Assembly approved the current
Statute of the Commission in 1979, making clear in Article 20
the Commission's jurisdiction over member States of the OAS
that are not parties to the American Convention.
The meager Commission budget permits its members to
hold only two ordinary sessions a year in Washington, D.C.,
each lasting about three weeks. During the rest of the year,
the Commissioners work from their respective home bases,
while the small Commission staff continues to receive and re-
view individual petitions and carry out the other powers and
duties of the Commission. The mandate of the Commission is
broad, permitting it, among other things, to make in loco vis-
its to countries where it is invited and to make reports and
recommendations on individual countries or issues, as it may
wish. In addition, at the Court, the Commission shifts its po-
sition from that of tribunal to prosecutor, representing vic-
tims before that tribunal. 4
The Commission's own caseload of individual petitions
always has been high, and recent statistics show that the up-
ward trend continues. In 1999, the Commission received 581
new petitions, had 945 petitions in process at year's end, and
Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in Defending
Borderless Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1606, 1615 (1997).
21. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 1, at 1-5.
22. Id. at 7-8.
23. Id. at 9-10.
24. As to the functions and powers of the Commission, see generally, Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, Articles 41, 57 and 61(1), as well as the more
detailed Statute (especially Articles 18 and 19) and Rules of Procedure of the
Commission.
116520021
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issued 52 precautionary measures in pending cases.5 In
2000, new cases rose with 681 new filings, but the overall
situation stayed about the same with 930 petitions in process
and the same number of precautionary measures issued as in
the previous year.26 This was all on a budget of $2.9 million,
which represents less than 3.7% of the total OAS budget. 7
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, after re-
viewing the Commission's budget in the early 1990s, con-
cluded that it was "a scandal."21
Historically, the United States government was an active
participant in the creation of the Inter-American human
rights system, and the U.S. continues to be one of its most
important political supporters. It played an active role in the
drafting of both the American Declaration and the American
Convention. 5 It contributes a significant proportion of the
funding for the OAS itself, as well as for the Commission.
Members of the Commission are appointed as independent
experts in human rights, and the United States consistently
has supported the nomination of superior and independent
candidates to both the Commission and the Court.
The U.S. government, then, has taken steps to assert its
political position about the need for the existence of the
25. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1999, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 45, ch. III,
pt. A, OEA/ser.LIV/II. 106, doc. 3 rev. (1999) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1999],
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/Chapter3.htm.
26. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2000, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 41, ch. III,
pt. A, OEA/ser.IV/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT
20001, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.3.htm.
27. Presentacion de la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en
la Primera Reunion del Grupo de Trabajo ad hoc por los Derechos Humanos[Presentation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the First
Meeting of the ad hoc Working Group on Human Rights], San Jose, Costa Rica
(Oct. 2, 2000), in ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 26, at 1623, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Discursos/10.02.00.Eng.htm.
28. Veronica Gomez, The Interaction between the Political Actors of the OAS,
the Commission and the Court, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 173, 201 & n.174 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingston eds. 1998).
29. See, e.g., United States: Report of the Delegation to the Inter-American
Specialized Conference on Human Rights (Apr. 22, 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
710 (1970).
30. See, e.g., Press Release No. 5/00, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Organization of American States (Apr. 25, 2000) (indicating a voluntary
contribution from the United States in the amount of $640,000 "to fund part of
the activities of the [Commission] and of the Rapporteur for Freedom of Expres-
sion").
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Commission and Court to aggressively address the problems
of human rights in the Western hemisphere. The U.S. gov-
ernment takes an entirely different posture, however, when it
asserts the legal position of the United States in defense of
human rights practices with regard to the death penalty.
III. EARLY COMMISSION CASES INVOLVING THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Two Commission Death Penalty Decisions in the 1980s
There are several decisions involving the United States
during the period of the 1970s and 1980s. However, there are
only two published "reports," as Commission decisions are re-
ferred to in their rules,3 dealing with the death penalty. The
first such decision was the 1987 report in Roach & Pinkerton
v. United States." The Commission reviewed the cases of
James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton, each of whom was
seventeen years old at the time of his conviction for murder
and sentence to death in South Carolina and Texas, respec-
tively." The Commission found by a vote of five to one that
their executions, each of which occurred while their cases
were pending before the Commission, were a violation of the
American Declaration's Article I right to life.'4 The Commis-
sion also found, by the same vote, a violation of Article II of
the Declaration, which deals with equality before the law."
Before reaching those conclusions, however, the Commis-
sion made three important findings. First, and perhaps most
importantly, it found that international obligations of the
United States within the OAS derive not from the American
Convention, but from its ratification of the Charter of the
OAS, and from the "acquired binding force" of the American
Declaration and the Statute and Regulations of the Commis-
sion."4 Second, it found that within the OAS member States,
31. Rules of Procedure, supra note 14, at Article 42(1).
32. Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser.LJV/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
33. Id. 23-33.
34. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
35. Roach & Pinkerton, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 64-65. Article II provides, in
full: "All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties estab-
lished in this Declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or
any other factor." American Declaration, supra note 1, art. II.
36.. Roach & Pinkerton, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 45-48.
11672002]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"there is a recognized norm of jus cogens which prohibits the
State execution of children." 7 Because of the existence of thisjus cogens norm-a peremptory norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted-U.S. objection to a customary norm barring
the execution of children was unavailing to avoid a violation. 8
Third, the Commission concluded that the "patchwork scheme
of legislation" in the states of the United States made the im-
position of the death penalty on juveniles "dependent, not
primarily, on the nature of the crime committed, but on the
location where it was committed."" This gave rise, the Com-
mission concluded, to violations of Articles I (right to life) and
II (right to equality) of the American Declaration. The rea-
soning of the Commission in this case has been severely criti-
cized within the academic community, particularly as to the
existence of ajus cogens norm in the Americas. °
The second death penalty case to be adjudicated by the
Commission came two years later, with the 1989 report in Ce-
lestine v. United States.4 ' In any contentious case before the
Commission, as is true with all international human rights
bodies, the petitioner must pass through two procedural
stages. First, the petitioner must show that the case is ad-
missible, that is, that it meets those procedural requirements
that allow the Commission to invoke its jurisdiction. The
most significant factor in admissibility, in turn, is the exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies or the successful invocation of one
of the exceptions to exhaustion.42 If the case is found to be
admissible, the case proceeds to a decision on the merits,
meaning that the Commission decides the substantive claims
that are presented. The new procedural rules of the Commis-
37. Id. 55.
38. Id. 1% 52-55.
39. Id. % 62.
40. See David Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders Violates Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 3 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339 (1988); Donald T.
Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds United States in Vio-
lation, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1988). Jus cogens norms, by definition, must be
"accepted by the international community as a whole." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 344, reprinted in SELECTED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 7, at 122, 135.
41. Case 10.031 (Celestine v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62,
OEA/ser.L.N/II.77, doc. 7 rev.1 (1989).
42. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 14, arts. 30-34. The Rule on exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies is Article 31.
1168 [Vol. 42
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sion make clear that these two stages of litigation will be de-
cided by separate written decisions, barring exceptional cir-
cumstances.43
In Celestine, the Commission applied its rules to declare
that the case was inadmissible for failure to state facts that
constitute a violation of the rights set out in the American
Declaration." The petitioner, who had been sentenced to
death in Louisiana, offered statistical evidence to establish
that racial discrimination in capital sentencing was so wide-
spread as to shift the burden of proof to the government to
prove the absence of discrimination. 5 Data was offered from
several states, but the data offered from Louisiana was typi-
cal. It showed that capital defendants who kill white rather
than black victims are three times as likely to receive a death
sentence, and that whites who kill blacks never receive the
death penalty.46 During the pendency of the petition at the
Commission, the United States Supreme Court decided
McClesky v. Kemp, 7 which rejected an appeal based on the
same set of data in the domestic context.
Although other claims were raised, the Commission
largely followed the reasoning of McClesky in concluding that
the petitioner had not presented sufficient evidence to show
that Willie Celestine's own conviction had resulted from ra-
cial discrimination. The Commission concluded that the sta-
tistical studies did not "make a prima facie case to prove the
allegations of discrimination." The Commission also found
that "this is a poor case upon which to recommend a reversal
of the U.S. criminal justice practice," given the brutality and
ti 41
"particularly heinous" nature of the crime.
In both Roach & Pinkerton" and Celestine," the Commis-
43. Id. arts. 37, 43, 45. Exceptional circumstances occur when the Commis-
sion decides to defer the decision on admissibility to the time of the decision on
the merits. See id. art. 37(3).
44. Celestine, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 45.
45. Id. 9191 14-15, 17.
46. Id. T 13-15.
47. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
48. Celestine, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 41-45.
49. Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
9191 9, 17, OEA/ser.IJVII.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The Secretary General of the
OAS also cabled an appeal on Terry Roach's behalf, urging the governor of
South Carolina to "follow the current tendency of almost all the countries in the
hemisphere and to stay the execution." Id. 9 12.
50. Celestine, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 9 2.
116920021
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sion intervened by cable or telegram with the U.S. Secretary
of State and the state governors seeking a stay pending the
outcome of the Commission's investigation. In both cases, the
government did not honor the precautionary measures and
the defendants were executed. These executions took place
long before any decision on the cases at the Commission.
That sad pattern still holds true today for virtually all peti-
tioners in death penalty cases.
B. Legal Positions Asserted by the U.S. Department of State
in Commission Proceedings
In proceedings at the Commission, the Office of the Legal
Advisor, an office of the United States Department of State,
represents the United States government. The Office "fur-
nishes advice on all legal issues, domestic and international,
arising in the course of the Department's work." That work
includes "assisting... in formulating and implementing the
foreign policies of the United States, and promoting the devel-
opment of international law and its institutions as a funda-
mental element of those policies."51 In proceedings at the
Commission, the Legal Advisor files pleadings and appears at
oral hearings as the official representative of the U.S. gov-
ernment on contentious petitions. As of the end of 2001,
there were approximately 130 permanent attorneys working
in the Office under the direction of the Legal Advisor. The
Legal Advisor holds the rank of Assistant Secretary of State
and reports to the Secretary. There are four Deputy Legal
Advisors under the Legal Advisor's direction who supervise
the work of attorneys in the various functions of the office.5"
All but one of the U.S. cases at the Commission involving
the imposition of the death penalty arise from convictions in
state courts.53 The governments of the various states, how-
ever, have no formal voice in Commission proceedings. 4 The
51. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PRACTICING LAW IN THE OFFICE OF THE
LEGAL ADVISOR, at http://www.state.gov/s/113190.htm (visited Jan. 25, 2002)
(emphasis added). See also Ashley Deeks, Inside "L": Some Thoughts on the Of-
fice of the Legal Advisor, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 503 (2001).
52. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 51.
53. The only exception is Garza v. United States. See Case 12.243 (Garza v.
United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
Raul Garza was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas. See id. 24.
54. On at least one occasion in the cases handled by the Clinic at the Coin-
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Legal Advisor presents the position of the United States gov-
ernment. The "voice" of the United States in foreign affairs is
the federal government because the states are excluded from
such matters under the U.S. Constitution. Doctrines of fed-
eral preemption and supremacy combine to give the federal
executive branch primacy in this area.55 Article I, section 10
of the Constitution sets out "a catalogue of prohibitions and
limitations upon the states, and most of them relate or are
relevant to foreign affairs."56
From the start, the United States government was an ac-
tive, engaged and vigorous party opponent to the individual
petitions by death row inmates in the United States. It al-
ways has submitted carefully crafted, prompt and sometimes
quite extensive written pleadings in such litigation. It does
take, however, an extremely narrow view of the assumption
of legal obligations by the United States in the field of human
rights generally, and in the death penalty in particular.
While the field of foreign relations presents a complex array
of diplomatic and legal questions, one might ask two simple
questions at the outset of this review. Why does the United
States government seek so aggressively to limit or bar the
application of international human rights norms that might
benefit individuals seeking the protection of these norms?
What foreign affairs concern of the U.S. government is served
by this narrow interpretation of individual rights in interna-
tional human rights law?
In Roach & Pinkerton, the United States government ar-
gued the validity of sources of international law, the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission, and the merits of the claim that in-
ternational human rights law bars the execution of children
under the age of eighteen. The government argued that "the
[American] Declaration is not a treaty and it is not binding on
the United States" and that "the Declaration was not drafted
with the intent to create legal obligations, therefore the Com-
mission should take special care ... not to overturn that
mission, the State Department had the "assistance" of an Assistant Attorney
General from the state of Utah. See Case 11.139 (Andrews v. United States),
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 140, OEA/ser.LJV/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
55. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE US
CONSTITUTION (2nd ed. 1996).
56. Id. at 151.
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meaning."7 It also argued that the Commission's interpretive
powers prohibited it from looking to any instrument other
than the American Declaration as a source of legal obliga-
tions. 8 Finally, it argued that there is no customary norm of
international human rights law that prohibits the execution
of children. If there is, it argued, the U.S. has dissented from
that norm to such an extent that it is a persistent objector in
international law, which exempts it from the norm."
As noted above, the Commission rejected the first of the
U.S. government's claims asserting that the American Decla-
ration did not create legal obligations. ° The Commission has
maintained and expressed this position, over repeated U.S.
government objections, in all subsequent cases in which such
claims have been invoked. Nonetheless, the Commission's in-
terpretation of the Declaration's obligations have not been
given domestic legal effect in the United States.
The Commission also rejected the government's second
assertion that the Declaration was the only source on which
the Commission could rely as a source of law. That interpre-
tation would have required the Commission to conclude that
the Declaration was a static legal document. On many sub-
57. Case 9647 (Roach & Pinkerton v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147,
38(d), OEA/ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
58. Id. I 38(e).
59. Id. I 38(g)-(i). The doctrine of persistent objection has received little
scholarly attention in the United States. See, e.g., Lynn Loschin, The Persistent
Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Frame-
work, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147 (1996). It is likely that this will
change, however, as the validity of the execution of juveniles under interna-
tional law takes on increasing importance. The question of the validity of the
execution of juveniles is not yet settled as a matter of domestic law in the
United States, but the issue has gone to the United States Supreme Court on
one occasion, and is likely to appear again. In Domingues v. State, the Nevada
Supreme Court held by a narrow majority that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights does not create a binding legal obligation on the
United States to bar the execution of children under the age of eighteen.
Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998). Mr. Domingues sought
review by writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. In its brief to
the Supreme Court urging denial of certiorari, the Solicitor General of the
United States adopted a legal position quite similar to that asserted by the U.S.
government in Roach & Pinkerton. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Domingues v. Nevada, No. 98-8327 (U.S. 1999). The Supreme Court
subsequently denied the writ. Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999). Be-
cause of the prevalence of death sentences and execution of children by the
states, this issue is likely to be presented to the Supreme Court again in the
near future.
60. See sources cited supra note 2.
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sequent occasions, the Commission has read the Declaration
as an evolving source of law, noting that its application of the
Declaration is consistent with those by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights. In Garza v. United States, a U.S. capital case decided
by the Commission last year, for example, the Commission
stated as follows:
[I]n interpreting and applying the Declaration, it is neces-
sary to consider its provisions in the context of the inter-
national and inter-American human rights systems more
broadly, in the light of developments in the field of human
rights law since the Declaration was first composed and
with due regard to other relevant rules of international
law applicable to member states against which complaints
of violations of the Declaration are properly lodged.V
Interestingly, there is no evidence on the face of the re-
ports in either Roach & Pinkerton or Celestine that the Com-
mission invoked its authority to issue precautionary meas-
ures, as its rules permit it to do, and as Terry Roach
specifically requested." Instead, the Commission wrote tele-
grams or cables to state and federal officials. In each in-
stance in which such messages were conveyed to the govern-
ment, responses differed. In the case of Terry Roach, the
State Department replied that "the matter is now in the
hands of authorities for the State of South Carolina and, un-
der the U.S. federal system, there are no legal grounds for ex-
ecutive intervention in the implementation of the sentence."63
In the case of Jay Pinkerton, the State Department again as-
serted that "there are no domestic legal grounds (... ) for ex-
ecutive intervention in the implementation of Mr. Pinkerton's
sentence."64 The Commission noted that the governor of
Texas did not respond to its request for a stay of execution.65
61. Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, 88,
OEA/ser.L/V/Il.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001). The Commission made direct reference,
both in text and in a footnote, to the evolutive interpretations of human rights
law taken by the human rights courts in the Americas and Europe. Id. 88 &
n.39.
62. Roach & Pinkerton, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 9 9. The precautionary measures
provisions of the Commission's Rules are now found in Article 25, formerly Arti-
cle 29 under the old rules.
63. Roach & Pinkerton, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 11.
64. Id. T 18.
65. Id.
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In Celestine, where telegrams were sent to both the Secretary
of State and the governor of Louisiana, the Commission
states only that "these requests were ignored" and Mr. Celes-
tine was executed shortly thereafter.66
The record is silent as to the conversations between fed-
eral and state officials regarding a response to the requests
for stay from the Commission. But it begs credulity to sug-
gest that the governors of the states in question would allow
executions to proceed in the face of a request for stay from an
international body, without ascertaining the views of the
State Department in this matter. It also appears true that
the State Department, both formally and informally, viewed
the choice to abide by a request for stay by the Commission as
one that lay exclusively with state officials rather than the
federal government. That position of international law seems
incongruous, at best, with the aforementioned doctrines of
federalism and preemption of the states in this area, doc-
trines that have consistently applied since the founding of the
nation.67 It would seem difficult, therefore, for the State De-
partment to justify inaction by the federal government based
on the assertion that these matters are outside of its purview
in federal-state relations. The issue would arise again in
later litigation with the United States at the Commission, as
discussed below.
IV. UNITED STATES DEATH PENALTY LITIGATION AT THE
COMMISSION SINCE 1990
The 1980s jurisprudence of the Commission on the death
penalty in the United States provides only a limited picture of
the issues presented under international human rights law.
In recent years, however, the United States has become one of
the most frequent states against which human rights com-
plaints are filed. Data first published in the 1999 Annual Re-
port of the Commission show twenty-seven petitions against
the United States in process, with fifty-six new petitions re-
66. Case 10.031 (Celestine v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 62, 2,
OEA/ser.L.N/II.77, doc. 7 rev.1 (1989).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. See also JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (1996) ("Ever since
Ware v. Hylton, [3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796),] the supremacy of international law
(treaty-based, customary, or that based on executive agreement) over state law
has been complete.").
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ceived in 1999, the third highest number of any state. 8 The
2000 Annual Report indicates that there were thirty-five
cases being processed against the United States, with sev-
enty-six new petitions received against the United States in
that same time period, again making it the third ranked
country in number of new filings in each of the two years in
question.69 Staff sources at the Commission indicate that
some sixty to seventy percent of the petitions raise challenges
to the application of the death penalty, and that virtually all
American petitioners are represented by counsel.
The Commission process generally is slow to reach reso-
lution on the merits, with some cases pending against the
United States for several years before final resolution. 9 This
fact, combined with the requirement of exhaustion of domes-
tic remedies, conspire to make it extremely difficult to obtain
a decision on the merits from the Commission prior to execu-
tion, where it might be able to be invoked in domestic courts
to greatest legal effect. In the Garza case, however, that goal
was achieved, as will be discussed in this section.
Decisions on precautionary measures, on the other hand,
are issued early in the process, sometimes within days of the
filing of the petition. The precautionary measures process
can be invoked by the Commission, according to its rules, "[i]n
68. ANNUAL REPORT 1999, supra note 25, ch. III, sec. B.
69. ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 26, ch. III, sec. B. Differences be-
tween the large number of cases received in 1999 (fifty-six) and the relatively
small number of cases in process during 2000 (thirty-five) are most likely ex-
plained by the slow process of "opening" a case at the Commission. Under pre-
vailing rules at the time, a case was not counted as part of the Commission's
docket until it was formally "opened." Opening constituted a recognition by the
Commission staff that the case satisfied, prima facie, the requirements for ad-
mission, such as sending pertinent parts of the petition to the government of the
country against which the petition was filed. Opening can be delayed, particu-
larly if there are serious questions as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies.
For an excellent discussion of this process, see Christina Cerna, The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights: Its Organization and Examination of
Petitions and Communications, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 28, at 65, 79-80.
70. The petition in Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/ser.JV/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998), for example, took nearly six years
to achieve a final decision, the initial petition having been filed in July of 1992,
with a decision by the Commission on the merits in March of 1998. The petition
in Sankofa v. United States, Case 11.193, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 387,
OEA/ser.IJV/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001), was filed in April of 1993 and has not
yet been decided on the merits. A decision on admissibility was published in
June of 2000.
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serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according
to the information available."7 The rules thus seem to permit
ex parte action, although the Commission sometimes requests
views from the government on its issuance of such measures.
The dynamic tension between the Commission's long-term ef-
fectiveness in decisions on the merits and its potential short-
term impact through the issuance of precautionary measures
will be the subject of analysis below.
A. Cases Resolved Against the United States: Merits and
Admissibility
Since Celestine, the Commission has issued two decisions
on the merits in capital cases and two decisions on admissibil-
ity. As indicated above, the docket is now heavy with U.S.
capital cases, with perhaps as many as fifty awaiting admis-
sibility or merits decisions. The direction of capital litigation
at the Commission has changed fundamentally, as have the
responses of the United States government.
The first of the cases to be decided on the merits was An-
drews v. United States."2 The original petition was filed on
July 27, 1992 by the International Human Rights Law Clinic
at American University and several co-counsel. The defen-
dant in the domestic case, William Andrews, had been on
death row in Utah since 1974, a period of some eighteen
years. He was scheduled for execution three days later, on
July 30, 1992. His lawyers asked for precautionary meas-
ures; in response the Commission sent notes to the U.S. State
Department and the governor of Utah seeking a stay of the
proceedings. The U.S. government replied by asserting that
"the petitioner did not have standing to file a petition which
was not filed in a timely fashion, and that it failed to estab-
lish any violation of the American Convention, that the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was
not legally binding, and that the case was inadmissible pur-
suant to Article 41 of the Commission's Regulations."73 The
defendant was executed as scheduled.
The petition was amended after the execution to include
the following claims before the Commission: violations of Ar-
71. Rules of Procedure, supra, note 14, art. 25.1.
72. Case 11.139 (Andrews v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser.IJV/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
73. Id. 1% 14, 15.
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ticle I of the American Declaration, regarding the right to life;
Article II, regarding the protection of racial equality; and Ar-
ticle XXVI, regarding the right to an impartial hearing and
protection against "cruel, infamous or unusual punishment"
for his eighteen-year wait on death row, during which at least
eight warrants for his execution were issued.4
The heart of the petition raised the question that had not
been answered in the Celestine case, nearly a decade before.
Celestine suggested that if the petitioner could provide
enough evidence of racial discrimination, the burden of proof
would shift to the state to prove its absence. Andrews was
such a case.
William Andrews was an African-American man sen-
tenced to death in a Salt Lake City courtroom where all of the
jurors were white, where the victims were all white, and
where the official tenets of the Mormon faith in 1974 held
that Black persons were "damned to death by God."75 The fac-
tual issue revolved around an incident at trial. While the ju-
rors in his case were sitting at lunch during the guilt-
determination phase of the trial, one of the jurors handed a
court bailiff a napkin on which were the hand-written words,
"Hang the nigger's [sic]." Beside the words was a drawing of
a black stick figure hanging from a gallows. The bailiff re-
ported the incident to the trial judge during a later hearing
on sequestration of the jury. Over the objections of defense
counsel, accompanied by a motion for mistrial, the trial con-
tinued, with the judge admonishing the jury only to "ignore
communications from foolish people." There was no effort to
ascertain who wrote the note, who among the jury had seen
it, or indeed, if one of the jurors may have written the note.6
Although there had been many appeals in Andrews' case,
no reviewing court in the United States had ever addressed
the error regarding the napkin incident, nor had a fact-
finding hearing ever been granted on the questions it raised.77
On denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in
1988, Justice Thurgood Marshall's dissent called the napkin
incident "a vulgar incident of lynch-mob racism reminiscent
74. Id. H 9-10.
75. Id. 3, 29.
76. Id. 24-26.
77. Id. 37.
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of Reconstruction days."78
In its pleadings before the Commission, the State De-
partment reiterated its "categorical rejection" of any assertion
that those instruments had acquired binding legal force in the
OAS. The government quoted at length from a statement
made to the OAS General Assembly by a State Department
representative:
The United States accepts and promotes the importance of
the American Declaration. It is a solemn moral and politi-
cal statement of the OAS member states, against which
each member state's respect for human rights is to be
evaluated and monitored, including the policies and prac-
tices of the United States .... The United States does not
believe, however, that the American Declaration has bind-
ing force as would an international treaty.7 9
On admissibility and on the merits, the United States re-
lied almost exclusively on domestic law, arguing that domes-
tic courts had provided sufficient review to Mr. Andrews."°
Moreover, on admissibility, the government argued such
technical issues as whether the petitioners had standing to
file the petition, whether the petition was timely filed within
six months after notification of a final ruling from which re-
lief was sought, whether domestic remedies had been ex-
hausted, and whether the petition should be dismissed be-
cause of petitioner's delay in filing a rebuttal to the
government." The Commission rejected each of these argu-
ments in turn, giving each short shrift. 2
The Commission found that all of the alleged violations of
the American Declaration had been proven. 3 Before reaching
78. Andrews v. Shulsen, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919, 920 (1988) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial).
79. Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. TT 59-60.
80. Despite the extensive invocation of international authority by the peti-
tioners, the only international authority invoked by the government on admis-
sibility was its attempt to rebut petitioner's reliance on Soering v. United King-
dom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) (1989), reprinted in 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 439
(1989), 28 ILM 1063 (1989). See Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 50-79, 86-91.
On the merits, the government again relied almost exclusively on domestic law.
See id. TT 113-22, 134-36. The only international authority cited was Gregory v.
United Kingdom, 16 H.R.L. J. 238 (1995), which the government sought to dis-
tinguish. See Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 135.
81. Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 98.
82. Id. 91 100-10.
83. Id. 91 146, 184-87.
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its conclusions, the Commission mentioned that it had re-
ceived an "Amicus Commisae" brief from Rights Interna-
tional, although it did not indicate that it had relied on it in
its conclusions.84 The Commission applied the internation-
ally-recognized standard on the issue of judge and jury im-
partiality, that of "an objective test based on 'reasonableness,
and the appearance of impartiality."'85 The Commission's ap-
plication of the standard, referring to authority from both the
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations
Committee to Eliminate Racial Discrimination, made it clear
that once the defendant has introduced evidence ("a suspi-
cion") that a juror might be biased, it is incumbent on the
government to investigate and to demonstrate that impartial-
ity had been maintained.86 Under the facts of this case, the
Commission concluded that the failure to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing of the jury following the evidence of racial bias
present in trial constituted violations of Articles XXVI and II,
which deprived Mr. Andrews of "an impartial trial in the
United States Courts."
87
Finally, the Commission found a violation of the Article
XXVI provisions against "cruel, infamous or unusual" pun-
ishment, noting that Mr. Andrews "spent eighteen years on
death row, and was not allowed to leave his cell for more than
a few hours a week. During that time he received notice of at
least eight execution dates and was executed by the State of
Utah in July of 1992 .. ,,88 Although it did not explicitly re-
fer to the decision, the Commission's conclusion arose from an
allegation that this case raised the issue of the "death row
phenomenon," which had given rise to a similar finding of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by the European
Convention of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom.89
After making its findings, the Commission recommended
84. Id. 1$ 138-39.
85. Id. 1 159.
86. Id. $91 159-61.
87. Id. $$ 171-74.
88. Id. $ 178.
89. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) (1989), reprinted
in 11 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 439 (1989), 28 ILM 1063 (1989). The "death row
phenomenon" refers to the prolonged wait by death row inmates of their execu-
tion, combined with repeated settings and delays of execution dates and harsh
conditions of confinement. See Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 91 112, and authori-
ties cited therein.
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that the United States "must provide adequate compensation
to Mr. William Andrews' next of kin" for the violations it had
found.9' It also asked the U.S. government to inform it of the
measures it had taken to comply with its recommendations. 9'
The U.S. government's response, by letter, stated that "Mr.
Andrews received an impartial trial free of racial bias," and
that it "cannot agree with the Commission's findings, or carry
out its recommendations."9 No domestic judicial action was
taken to enforce the Commission's recommendations.
The only other case to be resolved on the merits was
Garza v. United States, decided in April of 2001."' The case
was noteworthy from the outset for two significant reasons.
First, this was the first federal death penalty case to reach
the Commission, and, at the time of its filing, was the first
federal case to complete review in the United States after
broad expansion of the penalty at the federal level in 1988,
1994 and 1996.94 If the highly public "voluntary" execution of
Timothy McVeigh, the alleged Oklahoma City federal build-
ing bomber had not taken precedent, Garza would have been
the first federal execution in thirty-five years. Due to the
controversial nature of the issues in the case, President Clin-
ton granted two temporary reprieves in Garza's case, first in
August of 2000 and again in December of that year, which
also contributed to its being overshadowed by the McVeigh
appeals.9 A second noteworthy aspect of this case was that
90. Andrews, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 188.
91. Id. 189.
92. Id. 190.
93. Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255,
OEA/ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
94. Id. 74, in which the Commission notes that
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, rendering the death penalty available as a possible punishment
for certain drug-related offenses. Subsequently, in September 1994,
the Federal Death Penalty Act was enacted, which provided that over
40 offenses could be punished as capital crimes, and in 1996, the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act came into effect that further
extended the list of Federal capital crimes to include additional Federal
offenses.
Id.
95. The Report of the Commission in Garza indicates that the reprieve of
August 2000 was granted "until the U.S. Department of State had completed
drafting guidelines for seeking presidential clemency in such cases." Id. 1 10.
The reprieve of December 2000 was granted to permit the U.S. Department of
Justice to complete a study of possible racial and regional bias in the imposition
of the death penalty in the federal system. See Michelle Mittelstadt, Clinton
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the Commission decided it over a period of only sixteen
months, thus allowing domestic lawyers to argue, for the first
time, that the ruling of the Commission on the merits should
be enforced in domestic federal court, while the death row
inmate was still alive.
The petitioner argued at the threshold that capital pun-
ishment should be regarded as contrary to Article I of the
American Declaration, which protects the right to life. Alter-
natively, the petitioner argued that the worldwide trend is
toward abolition and that international law requires states to
progressively restrict the death penalty.96 The Commission,
however, while "deeply troubled" by the re-introduction of the
federal death penalty after thirty-five years, and by its exten-
sion to additional crimes, found no violation of Article I. The
Commission concluded that it "does not find before it suffi-
cient evidence establishing the existence of an international
legal norm binding upon the United States, under Article I of
the Declaration or customary international law, that prohib-
ited the extension of the death penalty to Mr. Garza's crimes,
provided that they are properly considered to be of a 'most se-
rious' nature."98 It did find that the re-introduction of the
death penalty into U.S. federal law was "inconsistent with the
spirit and purpose of numerous international human rights
instruments to which the State is a signatory or a party, and
[is] at odds with a demonstrable trend toward more restric-
tive application of the death penalty." " One Commissioner,
Helio Bicudo, expressed in a concurring opinion that "the
death penalty has already been abolished by the evolution of
the normative standards of the Inter-American system."'100
The Commission also found violations of Articles XVIII
(right to a fair trial) and XXVI (right to due process of law),
concluding that the sentencing jury improperly had found
that Mr. Garza had committed four unadjudicated murders in
Mexico.'0 ' The Commission recommended commutation of the
Delays Execution of Texas Killer, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 8, 2000, at 35A.
96. Garza, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 26-27.
97. Id. %1 94.
98. Id. 95. The Commission explicitly found, in the same paragraph, that
Garza's murder convictions constituted "most serious crimes," as required by
international law.
99. Id. 91 94.
100. Id. (Commissioner Helio Bicudo, concurring).
101. Id. 102-10.
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death sentence as an appropriate remedy, and suggested that
if the United States proceeded with Garza's execution, such
action "would give rise to its responsibility for serious and de-
liberate violations of its international obligations under the
OAS Charter and the American Declaration."10 2
The United States government did not respond publicly
to the Commission's final recommendations, and plans for
Mr. Garza's execution proceeded. The petitioners sought to
enforce the decision of the Commission in both the federal
district court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.'03 The attempt at enforcement was rejected,
and the execution of Mr. Garza proceeded on June 19, 2001,
after certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.'
Two capital cases from the United States have been
found admissible and will proceed to decisions on the merits.
The first is Sankofa v. United States, admitted before the
Commission just prior to Mr. Sankofa's scheduled execution
in Texas in June of 2000.105 This case arose in Texas, where
Shaka Sankofa was known as Gary T. Graham before he as-
sumed a Muslim name. He was seventeen years old at the
time of the alleged crime. In addition to his youth as a bar to
execution, Mr. Sankofa challenged his conviction based on a
claim that he could produce evidence proving his innocence of
the offense, evidence that he had not been able to produce
earlier because he had been represented by ineffective coun-
sel.10 ' The Texas courts held that he was procedurally barred
from raising his claims because he could not reach the "actual
innocence" threshold set by the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Herrera v. Collins."°7 Despite repeated issuance of
precautionary measures by the Commission, as well as a
strongly worded press release, Mr. Sankofa was executed on
June 22, 2000.°8
102. Id. $ 118.
103. Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2001).
104. Richard A. Serrano, Texas Murderer Becomes 2nd to Be Executed by U.S.
in 8 Days, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 2001, at All. Garza v. Lappin, cert. denied, 533
U.S. 924 (2001).
105. Case 11.193 (Sankofa v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 387,
OEA/ser.IJVII.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
106. The procedural history of Mr. Sankofa's claim of actual innocence is set
out in some detail in the summary of the procedural history of the petitioner's
case in the Commission's decision on admissibility. See id. 91 31.
107. 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993).
108. John Aloysius Farrell & Patricia Kilday Hart, Texas Executes Inmate as
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The second case declared admissible by the Commission
was that of Martinez-Villareal v. United States, admitted on
December 4, 2000.109 Mr. Martinez-Villareal is a Mexican na-
tional sentenced to death in Arizona in 1983. He argues vio-
lations of Articles I, XVIII and XXVI (rights to life, fair trial
and due process) of the American Declaration by virtue of his
denial of consular access under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. In addition, he argues violations of the
same provisions due to his denial of the right to effective
counsel and his mental illness, which renders him incompe-
tent to stand trial or to be sentenced to death. He argues vio-
lations of Articles XVIII and XXVI because of the delay in
rendering a final decision in his case, and violation of the
right to equality before the law under Article II "because of
the manner in which the death penalty is administered by the
states of the United States.""'
B. The Evolving Legal Position of the U.S. State Department
The State Department Legal Advisor's positions at the
Commission in recent cases continue, in some respects, its
pattern of resistance to the authority of the Commission. In
other ways, however, the Office's positions have become less
overtly hostile to the Commission's review.
The Office has continued to rely excessively on domestic
law in capital litigation before the Commission, grounding its
responses largely in a litany of domestic appellate cases de-
ciding issues against the petitioners in Andrews,"' Sankofa,"2
and Martinez-Villareal.
113
Until the Garza case, the United States seems also to
have adhered to hackneyed arguments that the decisions of
Final Appeals Fail, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 2000, at Al. Sankofa's petition
raises issues under Articles I and II (right to life and equality) of the American
Declaration because he was seventeen at the time of the offense for which he
was convicted; Articles XVIII and XXVI (fair trial and due process) because he
has been denied a forum in which to review his claim of innocence and because
he claimed to have been denied effective assistance of counsel; and Article XXVI
(due process) based on delay in his execution. See Sankofa, Inter-Am. C.H.R.
3.
109. Case No. 11.753 (Martinez-Villareal v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R.
409, OEA/ser.IJV/II.111 doc. 20 rev. (2001).
110. Id. 12.
111. See supra text accompanying note 80.
112. Sankofa, Inter-Am. C.H.R. $1 43-51.
113. Martinez-Villareal, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1 39-56.
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the Commission were not binding, and that failure to exhaust
domestic remedies prevents the petitioner from invocation of
the jurisdiction of the Commission. Exhaustion of domestic
remedies in capital cases is always a difficult process, with
ongoing and complex multiple reviews by appellate and trial
courts of the United States, particularly as execution grows
near. Remarkably, however, in Garza, the United States
made neither of these claims, whatever may have been the
reasoning of its lawyers. Instead, the United States con-
tended that the claim was manifestly ill-founded and failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted.14 The differ-
ent approach by the government may well have been the key
to the Commission's decision to push for speedy resolution of
the case prior to the petitioner's execution.
The U.S. government also has been more active in recent
years in oral proceedings before the Commission. In my early
years in litigation against the United States there, the State
Department routinely sent a student intern to observe and
report back what happened at hearings." '" In the last several
hearings involving capital litigation against the United States
at the Commission, more than one well-prepared lawyer from
the Legal Advisor's office (and sometimes unidentified min-
ions from other departments, usually the Department of Jus-
tice) has appeared to defend the United States.
C. Pending Cases Against the United States: Issues with
Enforcement of Precautionary Measures
In early death penalty cases against the United States,
the Commission did not use the formal device of precaution-
ary measures to prevent an execution. Instead, the Commis-
sion would send cables or notes to the government to seek a
stay of domestic proceedings pending Commission review. All
of that changed in the last five years.
Since 1996, the Commission has sought precautionary
measures in at least fourteen reported capital cases against
114. Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, 91 61, 64,
OEA/ser.IV/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001). The Commission noted the failure to
raise exhaustion by the government. See id. 61.
115. In Andrews v. United States, for example, the Commission notes that at
a February 1994 hearing, the "representative of the government observed the
hearing, but did not participate in the same." Case 11.139 (Andrews v. United
States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. [ 17, OEA/ser.IJV/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998).
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the United States, ten of which occurred in 2000.11 As the
caseload against the United States rises, it will almost cer-
tainly find itself the recipient of increasing numbers of such
requests, all of which, to date, have been ignored or, as in the
past, left to the discretion of the states.
The United States has strongly reiterated, as recently as
April of 2001 in Garza v. United States, that it believes the
precautionary measures issued by the Commission to be non-
binding." 7 In Garza, precautionary measures had been re-
quested by the Commission on January 27, 2000. In its re-
port on the merits, the Commission expressed at length and
in its strongest language to date, its displeasure with the
United States for failing to honor the Commission's request
for precautionary measures:
The Commission recognizes and is deeply concerned by
the fact that its ability to effectively investigate and de-
termine capital cases has frequently been undermined
when states have scheduled and proceeded with the exe-
cution of condemned prisoners despite the fact that those
prisoners have proceedings pending before the Commis-
sion. It is for this reason that the Commission requests
116. The following cases are noted in the Annual Reports of the Commission
from 1996 onward as having resulted in the issuance of precautionary meas-
ures: Richard Steven Zeitvogel v. United States, precautionary measures sought
on December 6, 1996, no response from the state; Allan J. Bannister v. United
States, Case No. 11.817, precautionary measures sought on October 15, 1997,
the United States reported that it had forwarded the measures to the Office of
the Attorney General of Missouri, petitioner executed October 23, 1997; Sean
Sellers v. United States, executed in Oklahoma on February 4, 1999 after issu-
ance of precautionary measures in January; David Leisure v. United States,
Case No. 12.201, Missouri defendant executed on September 1, 1999 after issu-
ance of precautionary measures on August 27, 1999. In the 2000 Annual Re-
port, supra, n. 26, the Commission issued precautionary measures in ten cases,
all of which were opened and are pending before the Commission: Douglas
Christopher Thomas, Case No. 12.240, precautionary measures issued on Janu-
ary 6, 2000; Juan Raul Garza, Case No. 12.243, precautionary measures issued
on January 27, 2000; Shaka Sankofa, Case No. 11.193, precautionary measures
issued on February 4, June 15 and June 22, 2000; Victor Saldano, Case No.
12.254, precautionary measures issued on March 13, 2000; Michael Domingues,
Case No. 12.285, precautionary measures issued on May 26, 2000; Johnny Paul
Penry, Case No. 12.340, precautionary measures issued on November 8, 2000;
James Wilson Chambers, Case No. 12.341, precautionary measures issued on
November 10, 2000; Alexander Williams, Case No. 12.348, precautionary meas-
ures issued on December 16, 2000; and Jose Jacobo Amaya Ruiz, Case No.
12.351, precautionary measures issued on December 15, 2000.
117. Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, $ 115,
OEA/ser.I_/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
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precautionary measures pursuant to Article 29(2) of its
Regulations, as it has in Mr. Garza's case, to require a
state to stay a condemned prisoner's execution until the
Commission has had an opportunity to investigate his or
her claims. Anything less effectively deprives condemned
prisoners of their right to petition in the inter-American
human rights system and causes them serious and irrepa-
rable harm. Accordingly, the Commission has on numer-
ous occasions called upon the United States and other
OAS member states to comply with the Commission's re-
quests for precautionary measures in cases involving
threats to the right to life and thereby properly and fully
respect their international human rights obligations." 8
The United States has faced increasingly hostile treat-
ment in other international tribunals with regard to its fail-
ure to abide by preliminary orders from those bodies. In the
judgment of the International Court of Justice on the merits
in the LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of Amer-
ica),"9 the Court concluded, for the first time in its history,
that its own provisional measures are binding.' ° The La-
Grand case also arose in the death penalty context. The
German government had sought review in the International
Court of Justice to settle a dispute with the United States
with regard to its obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.'"' On March 3, 1999, the Court issued
provisional measures to the United States ordering it not to
execute Mr. LaGrand during the pendency of proceedings be-
fore the Court.'
Germany's intervention arose in defense of a German na-
tional, Walter LaGrand, who had been sentenced to death in
Arizona without the benefit of consultation with his consu-
late. The German government sought to file an original ac-
118. Id. $1 66. In a footnote, the Commission noted that it had issued press
releases in the cases of both Sankofa v. United States and Miguel Angel Flores,
calling on the U.S. "and other OAS member states" to respect their interna-
tional human rights obligations. Id. 91 66 n.27.
119. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Final Judgment (June 27, 2001),
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm [hereinafter Final
Judgment].
120. Id. 91 109.
121. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings (2
Mar. 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
122. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (Request for the
Indication of Provisional Measures).
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tion in the United States Supreme Court to enforce the pre-
liminary measures order of the International Court of Justice,
which directed the United States to prevent Arizona's immi-
nently scheduled execution of Mr. LaGrand. Noting that the
U.S. Solicitor General had filed a letter that opposed any
stay, the Supreme Court denied Germany's motions, with dis-
sents by Justices Breyer and Stevens.'23 Walter LaGrand was
executed that same day.
24
The U.S. State Department, through the same office of
the Legal Advisor, defended U.S. government actions before
the ICJ on much the same basis as it had before the Commis-
sion. It argued that once it had received the provisional
measures from the Court, it "immediately transmitted the
Order to the Governor of Arizona," thereby placing "the Order
in the hands of the one official who, at that stage, might have
had the legal authority to stop the execution."'25 The govern-
ment argued that two central factors constrained its actions:
shortness of time and "the character of the United States of
America as a federal republic of divided powers."'26
The ICJ was not persuaded. It observed that "the mere
transmission of the Order to the Governor or Arizona without
any comment, particularly without even so much as a plea for
temporary stay and an explanation that there is no general
agreement on the position of the United States that orders of
the International Court of Justice on provisional measures
are non-binding, was certainly less than could have been done
even in the short time available.'2 7 The ICJ concluded "the
various competent United States authorities failed to take all
the steps they could have taken to give effect to the Court's
order."'28 The Commission has a similar argument with re-
spect to the adequacy of steps taken by the United States
government following issuance of its own precautionary
123. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1016 (1999).
124. Amnesty International, No More Excuse - The USA Must Obey Interna-
tional Court's Decision on Prisoner's Rights, June 28, 2001.
125. Final Judgment, supra note 119, 1I 95.
126. Id.
127. Id. j 112.
128. Id. 115. The ruling also suggests that the government's abstention
position may also have been overstated. For a position arguing that sub-
national units can and should be held responsible for human rights violations,
see Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 567 (1997).
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D. Advisory Opinion of Inter-American Court Rejecting the
U.S. Position
The United States government has appeared once in pro-
ceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
In 1999, the Court issued its Advisory Opinion OC-16.1"° The
United States appeared to defend its treatment of foreign na-
tionals on death row in the United States."' Mexico had in-
voked the advisory jurisdiction of the Court to clarify obliga-
tions of OAS states with regard to providing detainees in the
host state for consular access under the provisions of the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations. The Court roundly
rejected the U.S. government's position in virtually all re-
spects. Most importantly, it found that the Vienna Conven-
tion did create personal rights held by the detainee; that
compliance with the Vienna Convention contributes to effec-
tive implementation of the right to due process of law as set
forth in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which the United States is a party; that
strict observance of due process is required in order to avoid
the arbitrary deprivation of life by application of the death
penalty; and that the consequences for failure to notify a for-
eign national of the right to seek consular assistance affects
due process guarantees; the violations of which give rise to in-
ternational responsibility and the obligation to provide repa-
rations. 132
129. This is not to suggest that that the Commission has the same powers orjurisdiction over the United States as does the World Court, but only to suggest
the parallel of U.S. inaction in the two contexts. For other discussions of the
binding effects of the World Court's provisional measures, see Alison Dusbury,
Saving Lives in the International Court of Justice: The Use of Provisional Meas-
ures to Protect Human Rights, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 141 (2000); Eva Reiter, In-
terim Measures by the World Court to Suspend the Execution of an Individual:
the Breard Case, 16 NETHERLANDS Q. HUM. RTS. 475 (1998).
130. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, supra note 11.
131. The Death Penalty Information Center indicates that as of February 6,
2002, there were 119 identified foreign nationals on death row in 33 states, with53 from Mexico. Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals and the
Death Penalty in the United States (Feb. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/foreignnatl.html, visited on February 18, 2002.
132. For a discussion of these and the other holdings of the Court, see Wil-
liam J. Aceves, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Frame-
work of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 555 (2000).
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V. CONCLUSION: U.S. EXCEPTIONALISM IN LITIGATION AS
ABERRATION FROM EXPRESS FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
COMMUNITY OF NATIONS
In the Garza report by the Commission, the petitioners
mounted a frontal assault on the abolition of the death pen-
alty, arguing that international law had evolved to the point
that capital punishment was no longer permissible.' One
Commissioner agreed with that position, and others may fol-
low.' 4 In Garza, the Commission also took note of evidence
that suggests "the existence of an international trend toward
restrictive application of the death penalty," as well as asser-
tions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the
only fair reading of the American Convention is one which
will "reduce the application of the [death] penalty to bring
about its gradual disappearance."' 5 Other scholars have ar-
gued that the death penalty is now an inhuman punish-
ment,3 6 or that the entire structure of treaty law on the death
penalty is moving the world toward certain abolition.'
The United States government holds firm to its legal po-
sition that the death penalty is not a violation of interna-
tional law as the circle of death's defenders grows smaller and
smaller. For now, it ignores the reports and provisional
measures of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights issued against it.
This rigid legal position flies directly in the face of ex-
pressed U.S. foreign policy on consistency in the application
of human rights obligations in the region. In May of 1992, for
example, the U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Luigi R. Einaudi,
stated publicly that while the U.S. had not ratified the
American Convention, "We have never argued, however, that
nonratification exempts us from the Commission's criticism.
When we affirm support for the Commission, we express our
readiness to have its judgments applied to ourselves." 8' Simi-
133. Case 12.243 (Garza v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1255, $ 25,
OEA/ser.I.V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
134. Id. at 37, 66 (Commissioner Helio Bicudo, concurring).
135. Garza, Inter-Am. C.H.R. $ 93.
136. Manfred Nowak, Is the Death Penalty an Inhuman Punishment?, in THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETIVE
APPROACH 27 (Theodore S. Orlin et al. eds. 2000).
137. WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1997).
138. Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi, Permanent Representative of the United
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larly, in 1999, then-U.S. Ambassador to the OAS, Victor Mar-
rero, stated the following to a committee of the OAS: "We
have never argued that we are exempt from criticism by vir-
tue of our failure to ratify [the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights] .... We affirm no standard that we are not pre-
pared to have applied to ourselves and our support is for a
process to which we ourselves have submitted.""9 The consis-
tent practice of the Legal Advisor's office to negate absolutely
any invocation of legal authority by the Commission seems to
undermine our stated diplomatic position that we are full
partners in the assumption of human rights responsibilities
in the Americas.
Whether the legal effects of the Commission's decisions
are denied or accepted by the United States, however, each
ruling of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
makes the position of the United States in defense of capital
punishment less tenable. Each ruling creates additional
stigma for the United States, further isolating it in the world
community. Each ruling provides greater juridical precision
to international law on the death penalty and narrows the
terrain in which the U.S. government can justify its actions.
Each decision is a victory for the universal application of hu-
man rights norms, and each decision strongly signals the will
of the international community against the continued prac-
tices of the United States.4 ° If the Commission contributes
that, that is enough.
States, OAS General Assembly, Strengthening Support for Human Rights,
Statement Before the OAS General Assembly, Nassau, the Bahamas, May 20,
1992 (summary of statement on file with author) (emphasis added).
139. Ambassador Victor Marrero, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
OAS, U.S. Views on the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Human Rights System, Address Before the Committee on Juridical
and Political Affairs, Organization of American States, October 20, 1999 (on file
with author) (emphasis added).
140. I am grateful to Doug Cassel for a borrowed construct in this closing
paragraph. See Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make
a Difference?, 2 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 121 (2001).
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